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PERFORMING PAIDEIA: GREEK CULTURE AS AN INSTRUMENT
FOR SOCIAL PROMOTION IN THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D.
Paideia – i.e. Greek culture, comprising, amongst other things, language, literature, philo-
sophy and medicine – was a constituent component of the social identity of the elite of
the Roman empire: as a number of influential studies on the Second Sophistic have
recently shown, leading members of society presented themselves as such by their pos-
session and deployment of cultural capital, for example by performing oratory, writing
philosophy or showcasing medical interventions.1 As the ‘common language’ of the
men ruling the various parts of the empire, Greek culture became a characteristic of,
and thus a de facto condition for, leading socio-political positions. Whilst most elite
men would have taken for granted a good cultural education no less than a leading pos-
ition, an outstanding command of the classical Greek language, literature and tradition
as displayed in epideictic performances allowed some orators, philosophers and doctors
to move distinctively up the social ladder, sometimes reaching the ears of, and thereby
wielding influence over, the emperor himself.
In the absence of studies of comparable refinement examining the link between cul-
ture and power in late antiquity,2 it is often assumed that the great sophistic tradition lost
the vibrancy and dynamism that had characterized it under the Early Empire: pagan
Greek culture, fighting its last against the new religious, linguistic and pedagogical
trends that would soon carry the day, was now a body of dead material confined to
the schoolroom. Although elites across the eastern half of the Mediterranean would
therefore be acquainted with it, it had, so it is suggested, lost much of its social rel-
evance: Greek culture was no longer the vital step on the ladder of social mobility
that it had been during the first and second centuries.3 With regard to the fourth century,
1 S. Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, A.D. 50–
250 (Oxford, 1996); T. Schmitz, Bildung und Macht. Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zwei-
ten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit. Zetemata 97 (Munich, 1997); T. Whitmarsh,
Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation (Oxford, 2001). The dynamic, con-
structivist view of identity and status underlying these studies has now replaced the earlier structural
approach represented most clearly in K. Hopkins, ‘Elite mobility in the Roman Empire’, P&P 32
(1965), 12–26.
2 Cf. A. Cameron, ‘Education and literary culture’, in ead. and P. Garnsey (edd.), The Cambridge
Ancient History, vol. XIII. The Late Empire, A.D. 337–425 (Cambridge, 1998), 665–707, at 696.
3 Thus H.-I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris, 1938); P. Wolf, Vom
Schulwesen der Spätantike. Studien zu Libanius (Baden Baden, 1952); M. Hose, ‘Die Krise der
Rhetoren. Über den Bedeutungsverlust der institutionellen Rhetorik im 4. Jahrhundert und die
Reaktion ihrer Vertreter’, in C. Neumeister and W. Raeck (edd.), Rede und Redner. Bewertung und
Darstellung in den antiken Kulturen. Kolloquium Frankfurt a.M., 14.16. Oktober 1998 (Frankfurt,
2000), 289–99; R. Cribiore, The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch (Princeton, 2007);
A. Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of
the Classical Tradition (Cambridge, 2007), 40; P.-L. Malosse and B. Schouler, ‘Qu’est-ce que la
troisième sophistique ?’, Lalies 29 (2009), 161–224, at 164.
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this discourse of socio-cultural change is usually doubled up with reference to religious
changes: Greek culture fared badly under the Christian emperors of the Constantinian
dynasty, was then brought to a last great flourishing under Julian and finally died out
under the Christian emperors that succeeded Julian. This view, based on carefully
selected passages from the sophist Libanius, Julian himself, his panegyrist
Mamertinus and, above all, the historian Ammianus Marcellinus,4 was already held
by Edward Gibbon, and is still maintained by some scholars today.5
Over the last two decades or so, however, studies in late antiquity have replaced the
paradigm of change with one of transformation.6 With regard to Constantius II specifi-
cally, Peter Brown has stressed that few people deprived of cultural credentials made it
to the top during his reign, whilst the cultured elite continued to make successful careers
in local and imperial politics.7 This idea was subsequently elaborated by scholars such
as Eva-Maria Seiler and Nick Henck, who both stress Libanius’ prejudices in depicting
Constantius in a negative light.8 Henck adduces numerous sources that argue quite
the opposite view: authors such as Themistius and Aurelius Victor actually stress
Constantius’ cultural education, his contacts with cultural figures, and his promotion
of the liberal arts. Following this different set of sources,9 scholars have thus challenged
the traditional image of Constantius as an enemy of Greek culture.
Whilst the negative point – how not to see Constantius – made by these scholars is
undoubtedly correct, their methodology is questionable. Indeed, what Henck and others
seem to be doing is to prove the incorrectness of certain sources (Libanius, Ammianus,
Mamertinus) by adducing other sources, which present what these scholars think is a
4 For a survey of passages giving this presentation, cf. H.-U. Wiemer, Libanius und Julian. Studien
zum Verhältnis von Rhetorik und Politik im 4. Jahrhundert n. Chr. (Munich, 1995), 24 and n. 49;
Hose (n. 3); and N. Henck, ‘Constantius’ paideia, intellectual milieu and promotion of the liberal
arts’, PCPhS 47 (2001), 172–87, at 181–2. A brief confrontation between Ammianus’ views on
Constantius’ education and that found in the panegyrics of Libanius, Julian, Aurelius Victor and
Themistius can be found in M. Whitby, ‘Images of Constantius’, in J.W. Drijvers and D. Hunt
(edd.), The Late Roman World and its Historian: Interpreting Ammianus Marcellinus (London and
New York, 1999), 77–88, at 82.
5 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury, vol. 2
(London, 1935), 449–50; Hose (n. 3); J. Stenger, Hellenische Identität in der Spätantike.
Griechische Autoren und ihr Unbehagen an der eigenen Zeit, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur
und Geschichte 97 (Berlin, 2009), 87–8.
6 e.g. J.H.D. Scourfield ‘Introduction’, in id. (ed.), Texts and Culture in Late Antiquity: Inheritance,
Authority, and Change (Swansea, 2007), 4. Cf. also Cameron (n. 3), 705; Malosse and Schouler (n. 3),
167–8.
7 P. Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (Madison,
1992), 38. For the uninterrupted flourishing of rhetoric under Constantius, see also P. Barceló,
Constantius II. und seine Zeit : Die Anfänge des Staatskirchentums (Stuttgart, 2004), 29. On the con-
tinuity of the social background of senators in the fourth century, see also P. Heather, ‘Senators and
senates’, in Cameron and Garnsey (n. 2), 184–210; P. Heather, ‘Themistius. A political philosopher’,
in M. Whitby (ed.), The Propaganda of Power: The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity (Leiden,
1998), 125–150; P. Heather and D. Moncur, Politics, Philosophy and Empire in the Fourth
Century. Select Orations of Themistius, Translated Texts for Historians (Liverpool, 2001), 59.
8 E.-M. Seiler, Konstantios II. bei Libanios. Eine kritische Untersuchung des überlieferten
Herrscherbildes, Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe III 798 (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), 171–
9; Henck (n. 4).
9 To these literary sources, one could add CTh 14.1.1, an edict jointly issued by Constantius and
Julian in February 360, in which they state that ‘no person shall obtain a post of the first rank unless
it shall be proved that he excels in long practice of liberal studies and that he is so polished in literary
matters that words flow faultlessly from his pen’.
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more trustworthy account.10 In reality, however, none of the authors mentioned aims to
give an objective description of reality. A clear indication of this can be found in the fact
that whereas both Libanius and Themistius wrote a panegyric for Constantius, it is
Libanius (usually adduced to prove Constantius’ negative attitude towards Greek cul-
ture) and not Themistius (often thought to be much more positively disposed towards
Constantius) who explicitly commends the emperor for his good cultural education
(Lib. 59.32–4). Statements or silences about imperial attitudes towards Greek culture,
then, should be read for what they are: rhetorical claims.
This article presents a close yet contextualized analysis of a selection of interlocking
texts concerning the cultural–political interface between emperors and cultural figures in
order to illustrate the potential and pitfalls of Greek culture as an instrument for social
promotion in the fourth century A.D. Taken together, these texts, written by Themistius
(§ I), Constantius (§ II), Julian (§ III) and Libanius (§ IV), show that the story of the
success or failure of Greek culture as an instrument for socio-political promotion
under the reigns of Constantius or Julian is a complex one: far from being dependent
on either particular emperors and their religious preferences, or the beliefs and preju-
dices of individual authors, Greek culture in the fourth century, no less than before,
was a powerful but also strongly contested instrument of social promotion. By thus
highlighting the vitality and performative aspect of Greek culture under Christian and
pagan emperors alike, this article opens up a different perspective on late antique
Greek culture – a perspective that has thus far been largely neglected, but that needs
to be taken into account alongside more traditional interpretations if we are to come
to a full understanding of the role and place of traditional Greek culture in late antique
society.
I. THEMISTIUS, ON THE LOVE OF MANKIND OR CONSTANTIUS
Themistius’ first oration is a panegyric for Constantius, delivered in either 347 or 350.11
The most frequently followed pattern for such imperial panegyrics was that described by
Menander Rhetor as the βασιλικὸς λόγος, which subsequently praises an emperor’s
fatherland, family, birth, nature, education, accomplishments, military actions and
actions in times of peace.12 Themistius, however, explicitly refuses to follow this pat-
tern, and instead chooses to focus on one spiritual quality: ϕιλανθρωπία. Crowning
10 For an overview of all the sources concerning Constantius II, see C. Vogler, Constance II et l’ad-
ministration imperiale (Strasburg, 1979), 12–81.
11 For the date of Oration 1, see W. Portmann, ‘Zum Datum der ersten Rede des Themistius’, Klio
74 (1992), 411–21; T.D. Barnes, Athanasius and Constantius: Theology and Politics in the
Constantinian Empire (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 313 n. 21; J. Vanderspoel, Themistius and the
Imperial Court: Oratory, Civic Duty, and Paideia from Constantius to Theodosius (Ann Arbor,
1995), 73–7; O. Ballériaux, ‘La date du Πɛρὶ ϕιλανθρωπίας ἢ Κωνστάντιος (Discours I) de
Themistios’, Byzantion 66 (1996), 319–34; and Heather and Moncur (n. 7), 69–71, all with extensive
discussion and bibliography on earlier propositions. On Oration 1, see furthermore G. Downey,
‘Themistius’ First Oration’, GRBS 1 (1958), 49–69; Vanderspoel (this note), 71–83; and Heather
and Moncur (n. 7), 69–77.
12 The βασιλικὸς λόγος is discussed at the beginning of the second Treatise attributed to Menander.
Cf. D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, Menander Rhetor (Oxford, 1981), 76–95 and 271–81. For the
popularity of the scheme, cf. C.E.V. Nixon and B.S. Rogers (edd.), In Praise of Later Roman
Emperors: The Panegyrici Latini (Berkeley, 1994), 10–12; and Heather and Moncur (n. 7), 7, with
further bibliography in n. 19.
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more traditional virtues such as justice, self-control, courage and reasonableness, philan-
thropy makes the emperor similar to God (8b–9c). According to Themistius, he is the
first one to speak in the way he does (νῦν … πρῶτον, 1.1a). In fact, however,
Quintilian had already proposed a division of praise according to the various virtues
as an alternative structure for a panegyric alongside the scheme that would later be pro-
pagated by Menander:
Namque alias aetatis gradus gestarumque rerum ordinem sequi speciosius fuit, ut in primis annis
laudaretur indoles, tum disciplinae, post hoc operum id est factorum dictorumque contextus;
alias in species virtutum dividere laudem, fortitudinis, iustitiae, continentiae ceterarumque, ac
singulis adsignare, quae secundum quamque earum gesta erunt.
(Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 3.7.15)
It has sometimes proved the more effective course to trace a man’s life and deeds in due chro-
nological order, praising his natural gifts as a child, then his progress at school, and finally the
whole course of his life, including words as well as deeds. At times on the other hand it
is well to divide our praises, dealing separately with the various virtues, fortitude, justice,
self-control and the rest of them and to assign to each virtue the deeds performed under its
influence.
(tr. Butler [1921], 471)
At least one of the twelve speeches preserved in the Panegyrici Latini, probably
composed in 291, follows Quintilian’s second course, dividing his material on the
emperor Maximian (285/6–305) amongst the spiritual qualities of piety and felicity.13
Nevertheless, Themistius’ new mode of speaking differs in two significant respects
from Quintilian and the author of the Latin panegyric. First, there is Themistius’ choice
of philanthropy. On the one hand, this makes Themistius stand out because he selects
only one (ἕν, 1a; cf. also 16c) spiritual quality – thus going against Quintilian’s advice
and the Latin panegyric’s practice to divide (dividere) praise according to different vir-
tues. On the other hand, philanthropy was not one of the cardinal virtues recognized by
philosophers from Plato onwards but may, instead, have been inspired by the specific
mid-fourth century context:14 not only was philanthropy an ideal that could be shared
by Christians and pagans alike,15 but the main example Themistius gives of the emper-
or’s philanthropy – that he suspended executions (14b) – also clearly taps into the ideal
of an ‘unstained rule’, an ideal that was taking shape around that time. Indeed, as has
recently been demonstrated from various sides, the combination of philosophical, reli-
gious, legal and political-ideological ideas made clemency, and in particular the absten-
tion from executions, increasingly important as a standard against which emperors and
13 Pan. Lat. 11(3).6.1. On the importance of piety and felicity in the panegyric, as well as in the
reign of Maximian, cf. Nixon–Rogers (n. 12), 90 n. 40.
14 At the end of the speech, Themistius, looking back on his own speech, states that ‘this, then, is
the true and honest and pure offering to you from philosophy your contemporary’ (τοῦτο δὲ σοι παρὰ
ϕιλοσοϕίας τῆς ἡλικιώτιδος ἀνάθημα ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἄδολον καὶ ἀκήρατον). The word ἡλικιῶτις,
which can mean either ‘comrade’ or ‘contemporary’, may thus acquire a new sense: apart from point-
ing to Themistius’ friendship with Constantius (Downey [n. 11], 69) and the fact that both men were
born in the same year and were thus ‘contemporaries’ (Heather and Moncur [n. 7], 96 and n. 151),
Themistius may also be highlighting that the philosophy he is offering Constantius is adapted, and
particularly suited, to the mid-fourth century.
15 Cf. Heather and Moncur (n. 7), 24 and 67; Malosse and Schouler (n. 3), 202; Stenger (n. 5), 122–3.
For Themistius’ concept of philanthropy, see also L. Daly, ‘Themistius’ concept of philanthropia’,
Byzantion 45 (1975), 22–40.
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officials were weighed in late antiquity.16 The second major difference between
Themistius on the one hand and Quintilian and the Latin panegyrist on the other, con-
cerns the elaboration of the chosen virtue(s). Quintilian clearly suggests that virtues such
as courage, justice or self-control offer good headings under which to discuss the deeds
(gesta) performed under their influence. The Latin panegyrist, for example, discusses
the harmony between Maximian and his fellow Augustus Diocletian as an instance of
piety, and the despair of the barbarians as a result of this harmony under the heading
of felicity, with specific examples adduced to illustrate each of these virtues. Reading
the Latin panegyric thus gives one a reasonably good idea of Maximian’s reign and
achievements. The same is not true in Themistius’ panegyric. Apart from the reference
to Constantius’ suspension of the death penalty (14b), there is only one rather vague
allusion to a Persian military move (12b), and a reference to Constantius’ young age
(16c–17b), which is said to make the possession of virtues all the more remarkable.17
Yet apart from those three instances, Themistius largely speaks about ‘the philanthropic
king’ in general, in the third person. He will say, for example, that ‘the philanthropic
king’ (ὁ ϕιλάνθρωπος βασιλɛύς, 4b, 9a, 10c, 12c, 15b and 17b)18 treats his subjects
well. Such sentences can, of course, be read as a description of Constantius’ deeds,
but in the absence of specific references to Constantius, they rather convey the
impression of giving general advice as to how a good king should behave or how, in
other words, Constantius should behave if he wants to be (praised as) a good king.19
Taken together, these characteristics of Oration 1 create a well-defined impression:
Themistius’ choice of a treatment not according to Menander’s scheme but according
to virtues,20 his reference, alongside philanthropy, to traditional virtues such as courage
and justice, his stress on the fact that these virtues will make the good king similar to
god and his general rather than specific treatment of kingship – all these make for a
16 Cf. J. Harries, Law and Empire in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, 2001), 136–50; P. Van Nuffelen,
‘The unstained rule of Theodosius II. A Late Antique panegyrical topos and moral concern’, in T. Van
Houdt (ed.), Imago Virtutis: Studies on the Conceptualisation and Transformation of an Ancient Ideal
(Leuven and Namur, 2004), 229–56. Themistius’ first oration, although not discussed by Van
Nuffelen, may in fact be one of the earliest panegyrics exhibiting the greater importance attached
to the ideal of the ‘unstained rule’.
17 On the lack of concrete examples in Themistius’ first oration, cf. Stenger (n. 5), 127 and 181.
18 Attributively used, the adjective ϕιλάνθρωπος distinguishes the philanthropic king from another
kind of king. Given that Constantius is not being explicitly compared to any other emperor in the
speech (if delivered in 350, Constantius was already sole Emperor; but even if delivered before,
Constans is not mentioned in Themistius’ speech, as opposed, for example, to Libanius’ Panegyric
for Constantius and Constans), the opposition nevertheless concerns the philanthropic king versus
the tyrant more generally. This opposition is made explicit in 3v, 6a, 8c, 11b, 13a and 17d.
19 Constantius is addressed in the second person only in 1a, 2b, 14b and 18a. A clear case in which
Themistius’ advice is rather general occurs in 6a, where Themistius uses ϕημί with infinitive (‘to con-
tend that’) rather than λέγω with a ὅτι-clause (‘to state that’) when contending that justice is the most
important characteristic of a king. At other points, it is less clear whether Themistius is describing
Constantius’ practice or prescribing rules, yet often such ambiguous cases are surrounded by what
are clearly general rules rather than specific actions. A case in point can be found in 5b, which follows
5a and is followed by 5c. In 5a, Themistius in fact explicitly points out that his discourse is not depen-
dent on Constantius: καθ’ αὑτὸν ὁ λόγος βαδίζɛι καὶ οὐκ ἐπɛρɛίδɛται βασιλɛῖ τοῦ προɛλθɛῖν
ἀσϕαλέστɛρον (‘my speech goes its own way, and is not dependent upon the king in proceeding
with greater certainty’). The independence of Themistius as a praise-giver in this speech is also
noted by Stenger (n. 5), 117.
20 Whilst it would be wrong to see Quintilian’s ‘second course’ as inherently more philosophical
than Menander’s – Libanius’ speeches in honour of Julian, for example, clearly present Julian as a
philosopher whilst following Menander’s scheme (cf. Stenger [n. 5], 188) – this and the other
elements enumerated here add to the philosophical nature of the text.
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panegyric of a remarkably philosophical kind. Themistius thus adroitly selects topoi and
generic conventions of imperial panegyrics in order to present his speech as a work of
philosophy. This presentation suits the êthos of the speaker very well, as Themistius was
establishing himself as a teacher of philosophy and commentator on Aristotle’s works
when he delivered this oration.21 Indeed, at the beginning of his text, Themistius con-
fidently contrasts his own, philosophical praise of Constantius with ‘average praise-
givers’ who, he claims, are unable to grasp the emperor’s virtues (1a–2b).22 A few
pages later, Themistius offers the audience the opportunity to challenge his philosophi-
cal credentials if they can find falsehoods in his discourse about Constantius:
ɛἰ μέν τι καὶ σμικρὸν ϕɛνακίζοντα ἐξɛύροιτɛ, λοιδορɛῖν τɛ καὶ ἀπωθɛῖσθαι καὶ ἐκβάλλɛιν
ϕιλοσοϕίας, ὡς οὔτɛ ὅσια δρῶντα οὔτɛ ξύμϕωνα τοῖς ἐκɛίνης νόμοις· ɛἰ δὲ ὅσα
ἐπαινέσɛται, τοσάδɛ καὶ ἀληθɛύσɛται, μή τοι πρὸς αὐτὸν δυσκολαίνɛιν μηδὲ οἴɛσθαι
κόλακα ἀντ’ ἐπαινέτου· ὡς κολακɛίας μὲν οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅ τι δυσμɛνέστɛρον ἀληθɛίᾳ, ὁ δὲ
ἔπαινος μαρτύριόν ἐστιν ἀρɛτῆς· μαρτυρɛῖ δὲ ἕκαστος καλῶς ἃ γινώσκɛι. ὥσπɛρ οὖν τῶν
ἄλλων ἑκάστου μάρτυς ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἐπισταμɛνος, οὕτω καὶ ἀρɛτῆς οἱ ταύτην ɛἰδóτɛς.
Ξυνήκατɛ οὖν ὃ ξυντέθɛικɛν ὁ λόγος, μόνους ɛἶναι τοὺς ϕιλοσόϕους μάρτυρας ἀρɛτῆς.
(Themistius, Oration 1.3c–d)
If you discover it [i.e. the speech] to be cheating even in the smallest degree, insult and reject it
and cast it from philosophy for doing things which are neither righteous nor in accordance with
her laws. But, if in all that it praises, it tells the truth, then do not be angry with it, nor think it a
flatterer instead of a praisegiver. For nothing is more inimical to truth than flattery, but praise is
virtue’s witness. Each man bears witness to what he knows. And so, as he who understands one
particular thing among everything else is a good witness to it, so too those who recognise it are
good witnesses to virtue. You understand then what my discourse has established: only philo-
sophers are witnesses to virtue.
(tr. Heather and Moncur [n. 7], 80)
This professed openness to criticism did not entail too much of a risk for Themistius: not
only was his rather general discourse not very likely to contain blatant lies, but objecting
to Themistius’ claims to truth in praising Constantius would also entail belittling and
thereby insulting the emperor – something not many people in the audience would
dare to do, especially not with the emperor present during the original delivery of the
discourse.23 If not an act of bravery, then, Themistius’ seemingly magnanimous gesture
surely was a clever rhetorical strategy: if the audience, although explicitly invited to,
does not deny his speech the status of philosophy, then surely Themistius can lay
claim to being a philosopher and, as such, a truthful praise-giver.
The propagation of a philosophical self-image in an address to an emperor was,
of course, not new. Themistius’ first oration comes close, in this respect, to Dio
Chrysostom’s Kingship Orations.24 No less than in the second century, then, philosophy
21 For the importance of making clear the speaker’s êthos or ‘moral character’ in the speech in order
to convince the audience, cf. Arist. Rh. 1.2.3–4.
22 Cf. Themistius’ Oration 24, his only surviving speech to have been delivered before Oration 1;
in it Themistius favourably compares his own, philosophical rhetoric, to that of other, more
sophistic(ated) orators.
23 For the original delivery of the discourse, see below § II. Note that some years later, Julian, in his
Letter to Themistius 253c–254b, derides Themistius’ claims to truth in praising him as Heracles or
Dionysus. Cf. Heather and Moncur (n. 7), 20–1.
24 For the Dionic echoes in Themistius’ philosophical self-presentation, see Whitby (n. 4), 78. I
leave aside here the discussion of whether Dio delivered his Kingship Orations in Trajan’s presence:
what matters is that Dio purports to be addressing Trajan, and can reasonably be assumed to have
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can be and is being used in the fourth century in order to gain access to power.25
Yet although Themistius may have been influenced by Dio’s third Kingship Oration
in particular, he in no way merely copies the topos of the truth-speaking philosopher,
but adapts it to suit a different context: Themistius lays more stress on the positive
point that he is a truth-speaking philosopher, whilst Dio seems to feel more of a need
to defend himself against, or at least to distance himself from, accusations of flattery.26
At first sight, this may seem paradoxical, as Themistius clearly presents his oration as a
panegyric, whilst Dio’s speech is for a considerable part laid in the mouth of Socrates.
Yet consideration of the situation in which each author found himself whilst delivering
his kingship oration explains these differences. Dio’s third Kingship Oration was written
under Trajan, which means that Dio must have been at least fifty, quite possibly more
than sixty, years old, and a long-established figure on the cultural scene.27 If this meant
that he did not need to establish himself as a philosophical authority, it also implied that
he was open to the charge of having thrived so much and so long because of being a
flatterer.28 For Themistius, on the other hand, Oration 1 seems to have been, as far as
we can see, one of his first entrances on the public scene: only one other oration chrono-
logically precedes his panegyric for Constantius.29 At the time of delivery, Themistius
was at most 33 years old and, on top of that, he did not come from anything near as
privileged a background as Dio: his father, like Themistius himself, was a teacher of
philosophy from Paphlagonia, a rather remote part of the Roman Empire.30
In line with his louder claim for philosophical credibility, Themistius also seems to
go further than Dio in detaching himself from worldly motivations. Indeed, whilst Dio
denies speaking for money, his attitude towards reputation seems to be deliberately
unclear: initially Dio suggests that reputation, like money or pleasure, is a bad motive,
yet while he explicitly rejects the latter two, he merely states that flattery is not the best
way to build up a good reputation (third Kingship Oration, 14–17) – thus suggesting that
his philosophical praise will yield honour. Themistius, on the other hand, explicitly
denies that he is speaking for either money or τιμή, honour or office:
hoped to reach the emperor’s ear either directly or indirectly. On the question of Trajan’s presence, cf.
Swain (n. 1), 193–4 and Whitmarsh (n. 1), 186–8 and 325–7, with further bibliography.
25 For philosophy as a way of gaining access to power, cf. J. Hahn, Der Philosoph und die
Gesellschaft. Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der hohen
Kaiserzeit (Stuttgart, 1989); Whitmarsh (n. 1), 181–246.
26 There are more than ten mentions of flattery in Dio’s third Kingship Oration (3.3, 12, 13, 16, 17,
19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 149), as against just the two in Themistius (twice in 3c). Conversely, ‘philosophy’
does not occur in Dio’s third Kingship Oration, whilst it occurs seven times in Themistius’ first oration
(1a, 3c, 3d, 9b, 13b, 18a, 18b).
27 According to J. Moles, ‘The Kingship Orations of Dio Chrysostom’, PLLS 6 (1990), 297–375, at
361, the third Kingship Oration was the last to be written by Dio.
28 Dio indeed admits to have been familiar with Trajan for a long time (3.2), yet he evokes his free-
dom of speech under Trajan’s cruel predecessors (3.12–13) in order to ‘prove’ that he will definitely
not flatter the mild emperor that Trajan is. Nevertheless, he feels the need over and over again to set
himself apart from flatterers (cf. n. 26 above). Note also that Themistius will have to counter similar
criticisms after assuming the Urban Prefecture of Constantinople under Theodosius (cf. Or. 17, 31 and
34).
29 Oration 24, to be dated in the early 340s. For the date of Themistius’ so-called private orations,
see R.J. Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2000), xiii
and 1–48. Oration 1 is the first (also chronologically) of the so-called public orations.
30 For Paphlagonia’s reputation for backwardness, see C. Marek, ‘Paphlagonia’, DNP 9 (2000),
282–3.
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τοῦτο δή σοι παρὰ ϕιλοσοϕίας ἡλικιώτιδος τὸ ἀνάθημα ἀληθινὸν καὶ ἄδολον καὶ ἀκήρατον,
… ὧν γὰρ ἕνɛκɛν ἄνθρωπος ὑποκρίνɛται τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τούτων ἐλɛυθέρα ἐστὶ ϕιλοσοϕία.
χρημάτων τɛ γὰρ αὐτῇ οὐδὲ ɛἷς λόγος τιμῆς τɛ οὐκ ἐνδɛής, οἴκοι τὸ τίμιον ἔχουσα.
(Themistius, Oration 1.18a–b)
This, then, is the true and honest and pure offering to you from philosophy your contemporary
… Philosophy is free from those reasons why man feigns his praises. For her, money is of no
consideration at all, nor does she require honour, keeping what is of value within her.
(tr. Heather and Moncur [n. 7], 96)
II. CONSTANTIUS, LETTER TO THE SENATE CONCERNING THEMISTIUS
This apparently straightforward declaration of philosophical detachment on Themistius’
part should not delude us, however, as it did not in any sense impede Constantius from
conferring honour on Themistius, nor Themistius from accepting the honour. Indeed,
with the so-called Demegoria Constantii, a Greek translation of a Latin letter of the
emperor Constantius to the senate of Constantinople, Constantius announced the adlec-
tion of Themistius to the senate in September 355. Traditionally, scholars have read the
letter as Constantius’ answer to Themistius’ first oration. Some have even suggested
that the letter was originally ghost-written in Greek by Themistius, and then translated
into Latin before being read to the senate.31 Yet whilst Constantius’ letter does pick up
on various topics that we have encountered in Themistius’ oration,32 closer examin-
ation shows that Constantius did not so much take over Themistius’ ideas, as enter
into dialogue with them. At stake, in this dialogue, is the relationship between philos-
ophy and society and, by extension, the power balance between Constantius and
Themistius.
Themistius, as we have seen, established a strict boundary between philosophy and
society: he opposed himself to other praise-givers and truth to flattery; and he explicitly
denied worldly ambitions in praising the emperor. As Constantius explicitly indicates,
he is well aware of the fact that Themistius wishes to be praised only for his philoso-
phical qualities,33 but refuses to go along with the philosopher’s wishes. Indeed, accord-
ing to Constantius, all men of good sense, including rhetoricians and philosophers,
strive towards one and the same summit of repute (19b). If Constantius thus calls
31 Heather and Moncur (n. 7), 97 n. 154. Given the different power balance in the Demegoria as
compared to Themistius’ first oration, however, I do not think it likely that Themistius was the author
of the Demegoria, as has been suggested.
32 e.g. the importance of virtue: 19c, 19d, 20b, 23c; Themistius’ status as a philosopher: 19a, 19d,
20a, 20b, 21c, 22a, 22b, 22c, 22d ff.; the importance of speaking the truth: 19a, 20c. S. Elm, Sons of
Hellenism, Fathers of the Church: Emperor Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Vision of Rome
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2012), 81 therefore talks about ‘Constantius’s endorsement of
Themistius’s philosophical concepts’, stating that ‘Themistius’s views and his philosophical life
stood for Constantius’s interpretation of the philosophical life as governance’. As this article
shows, however, Constantius’ view on the philosophical life does not entirely coincide with that of
Themistius.
33 ɛὖ οἶδα ὅτι τῶν κατɛιλɛγμένων ἐπαίνων οὐ μɛτὰ τῆς ἴσης ἡδονῆς ἁπάντων ἀκούɛι Θɛμίστιος,
ἀλλὰ μόνους τοὺς ὑπὲρ ϕιλοσοϕίας οἰκɛίους ἡγɛῖται, τοὺς λοιποὺς δὲ ἢ λέγɛσθαι μɛτρίως ἢ
σιωπᾶσθαι βούλɛται (‘I know well that Themistius does not listen to this whole catalogue of praises
with equal pleasure but only has regard for those which relate to philosophy and wishes the rest either
to be spoken of in moderation or left in silence’, 22c tr. Heather and Moncur [n. 7], 113).
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Themistius’ bluff when he claims not to be moved by either money or honour,34 he also
refuses to follow Themistius’ suggestion that virtue is the only ground for true praise:
instead of praising Themistius only for his philosophy, Constantius also commends
him for his financial situation, marriage and ancestry in order to show that even ‘phil-
osophy aside, the man is worthy of the Senate’ (21d; cf. also 21c–23b). As opposed to
Themistius’ public self-image as projected in Oration 1, the philosopher thus appears
from Constantius’ presentation as a rather more worldly figure – and this is how it
should be, according to the emperor. True philosophy as Constantius sees it, is in no
way opposed to society: ‘do not think that the true philosophy banishes itself completely
from communal life or turns itself entirely away from the care of common affairs’ (22b).
Or, to put it differently, if one wants to be a true philosopher – that is, a philosopher
appreciated by Constantius – one should not withdraw from society but engage in it.
Constantius as it were highlights his rejection of Themistius’ view on philosophy
and society by repeatedly talking about the τιμή given to Themistius (19a, 19b, 19d,
21a, 21c, 23d) – τιμή having been explicitly rejected by Themistius as a motivation
for Oration 1. Constantius’ adlection of Themistius to the senate thus becomes a
proxy for his redefinition of the relationship between philosophy and society. The fol-
lowing passage is highly significant in this respect:
ὥσθ᾿ ὅπɛρ ἀρχόμɛνος ɛἶπον, κοινὴν ὑμῖν καὶ Θɛμιστίῳ δίδωμι τὴν τιμήν. μɛταλαβὼν γὰρ
παρ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀξιώματος Ῥωμαïκοῦ ἀντɛισϕέρɛι σοϕίαν Ἑλληνικὴν, ὥστɛ τὴν πόλιν διὰ
τοῦτο δɛικνύσθαι τὴν ἡμɛτέραν κορυϕὴν ὁμοῦ τύχης καὶ ἀρɛτῆς. νικῶσα γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἀγαθοῖς νῦν προσλαμβάνɛι τὸ τιμιώτατον. ɛἰ γὰρ τɛίχɛσι μὲν αὐτὴν πɛριϕραγνύναι,
κοσμɛῖν δὲ τοῖς ἔνδον οἰκοδομήσασι, δήμου δὲ πλήθɛι στɛνοχωρɛῖν, σημɛίον ἀγαπῶντός
ἐστι βασιλέως, πόσῳ μᾶλλον αὔξɛιν τὴν γɛρουσίαν τοιαύτῃ προσθήκῃ, ἣ τὰς ψυχὰς
βɛλτίους ποιήσɛι τῶν ἐνοικούντων καὶ μɛτὰ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρɛτῆς
ἀναστήσɛι γυμνάσιον; … ὡς ὁ μὲν τῇ πόλɛι τὰ ἄλλα σκɛυαζόμɛνος τὰ πρῶτα δίδωσι τῶν
ἀγαθῶν, ϕρονήσɛως δὲ καὶ παιδɛίας ἐπιμɛλούμɛνος τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκπορίζɛι.
(Demegoria Constantii 21b–c)
As I said at the beginning, I offer this as a shared honour for you and for Themistius. For he gets
from us a share in Roman dignity and, in return, introduces Hellenic wisdom, so that our city is
shown to be the summit of good fortune and, at the same time, of virtue. For being pre-eminent
in all other good things, she now acquires the most valuable one as well. For if it is the sign of a
loving emperor to fortify her with walls, to adorn her with buildings within, and to crowd her
with a host of citizens, how much more so is it to augment the senate with such an addition that
shall improve the souls of those who dwell in her and raise up the gymnasium of virtue along
with all the other buildings? … So that he who furnishes the city with the rest, gives it most
important advantages, but he who takes care of wisdom and education supplies it with the sover-
eign boon.
As the first sentence of this passage indicates, Constantius, throughout the Demegoria,
presents his adlection of Themistius to the senate as a gift not only to Themistius, but
also to the senate: Constantius gives Themistius to the senate, and the senate to
Themistius. This stress on the twofold gift has two implications. First, giving something
implies, and thereby confirms, the giver’s power: by giving political honour to
Themistius and philosophy to the senate Constantius, in other words, presents himself
as a man of both worlds, whom the worldly values of his audience, the senators, do
34 Note also that Constantius stresses that Themistius, ‘though careless of wealth, is nevertheless
not oppressed by poverty’ (22a).
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not escape, but who also shows himself to be a cultured ruler, able to appreciate philo-
sophy (21c, 20d, 21b–c, 23c–d). The second implication of Constantius’ ‘giving’ of
Themistius to the senate and vice versa is that it is clearly intended to change both:
whilst true philosophy is said to engage in society, the body politic is to become
more virtuous.35 Ipso facto, then, Constantius, in uniting philosophy and political
power within his own person, presents himself as the example to be followed by both
Themistius and the senate.
Like Themistius in his first oration, Constantius also refers to the opposition – fam-
iliar from the Second Sophistic, including Dio’s Kingship Orations – between Greek
wisdom and Roman power.36 The interpretations of the topos given by the two authors
are very different, though. In Themistius’ presentation, it is the philosopher who sets the
rules: as in Dio Chrysostom,37 the emperor is judged against the standards of philo-
sophy. Constantius, on the other hand, although referring to the Dionic topos much
more explicitly than Themistius, empowers himself as an emperor: acquainted with,
and successful in, both philosophy and society, it is the emperor who is in control.38
This new power balance is illustrated very clearly in the passage just quoted:39 if
Constantius adlects Themistius to the senate, this adds to the glory of Constantinople.40
Themistius thus becomes a means, alongside others, through which the emperor embel-
lishes a city inextricably linked, through its very name, to the Constantinian dynasty rep-
resented by Constantius.
Given the Themistian echoes in Constantius’ Demegoria, Themistius’ adlection to
the senate may at first sight seem to be the result of his first oration.41 This impression
is strongly reinforced by the fact that the Demegoria follows, in modern text editions,
immediately upon Oration 1. In the manuscripts of Themistius, Oration 1, the
Demegoria and three other early Themistian orations are each preceded by a hypothesis.
If it is correct, as scholars have argued, that these hypotheseis show Themistius’ hand in
the publication of the first edition of these works as a group,42 it may well be that he
consciously used Constantius’ letter in order to create the impression of a smooth and
effortless promotion as a result of Oration 1. It should not be forgotten, however, that
at least five, and possibly eight, years went by between Themistius’ first oration and
35 The senate’s concern for virtue is highlighted in 19c–d.
36 Cf. Swain (n. 1), 6, 40, 88 and Whitmarsh (n. 1), 1–20.
37 Cf. Whitmarsh (n. 1), 210–13.
38 In his speech of thanks, written in response to the Demegoria, Themistius will once again judge
the emperor against the standards of philosophy (Or. 2.25a, 26a–b, 30b, 36b–c, 40a), whilst at the
same time presenting himself as a philosopher thoroughly engaged in society (Or. 2.31a–b, 32a, 34d).
39 See also 20d, 21a, 21d, and 22b.
40 See also 20d, 21a, 21b, 21d, 22b. For the early development of Constantinople, see furthermore
G. Dagron, Naissance d’une capitale. Constantinople et ses institutions de 330 à 451 (Paris, 1974);
C. Mango, Le développement urbain de Constantinople (IVe – VIIe siècles), Travaux et Mémoires 2
(Paris, 1985); and Vanderspoel (n. 11), 51–70; on the Constantinopolitan senate, see A. Skinner, ‘The
birth of a “Byzantine” senatorial perspective’, Arethusa 33 (2000), 363–77; for the choice of senators
in Constantinople, cf. P. Heather, ‘New men for new Constantines? Creating an imperial elite in the
Eastern Mediterranean’, in P. Magdalino (ed.), New Constantines: The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in
Byzantium, 4th–13th Centuries, Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies 2 (London, 1994),
11–33.
41 e.g. Vanderspoel (n. 11), 77 (‘it may have led to his appointment at the city’) and Stenger (n. 5),
117 (‘… in seiner ersten Rede, mit der er Zugang zur näheren Umgebung des Constantius erlangte’).
42 For the manuscript tradition, see G. Downey, Themistii Orationes quae supersunt (Leipzig,
1965), vii–xxv; Heather and Moncur (n. 7), xv–xvi. For the authorship of the hypotheseis preceding
Themistius’ Orations 1, 2, 4 and 20 and Constantius’ Letter to the Senate, cf. Heather and Moncur
(n. 7), 75–6 and Henck (n. 4), 179.
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his political promotion – years in which other cultural figures too were attracting
Constantius’ attention with speeches in his honour.43 One can refer, for example, to
Himerius44 and Bemarchius,45 but by far the most famous speech for Constantius along-
side Themistius’ orations is Libanius’ Panegyric for Constantius and Constans (Oration
59).46 When comparing Themistius’ and Libanius’ speeches for Constantius and their
ensuing careers, it looks at first sight as though Themistius was much more successful:
Themistius probably delivered his panegyric in the emperor’s presence,47 was adlected
to the Senate and became an advisor to Constantius, whilst Libanius may never have met
Constantius48 and, after having spent some ten years in Constantinople, ended up return-
ing to his home city Antioch. The truth of the matter is, however, more complex. After
having delivered his first oration for Constantius in either 347 or 350,49 Themistius, as
we have seen, had to wait until 355 in order to be officially honoured by Constantius
with the adlection to the senate. Libanius, on the other hand, had not only been ordered
to stay in Constantinople by imperial decree even before delivering his panegyric, he
also received an imperial summons to return to Constantinople shortly after delivering
his Panegyric,50 traditionally dated in 348/9.51 This means that Libanius’ Panegyric was
probably rewarded much more quickly than Themistius’ first oration, and above all that
Libanius received imperial acknowledgement more than five years before Themistius
43 On the Latin side one can think, for example, of Firmicius Maternus, and Aurelius Victor.
44 A fragment (fr. 1.6: R.J. Penella, Man and the Word: The Orations of Himerius, The
Transformation of the Classical Heritage 43 [Berkeley, 2007], 272–4) has been preserved of a speech
for Constantius by Himerius, probably delivered in Sirmium on the occasion of Gallus’ Caesarship
(March 351). Cf. also T.D. Barnes, ‘Himerius and the fourth century’, CPh 82 (1987), 206–25, at
209, 212, 224. Himerius seems to have been active, or even based, in Constantinople between 343
and 352. Active: Penella (n. 44), 3–4; settled: Barnes (this note), 210, 212, 224.
45 Bemarchius is called a ‘staunch supporter of Constantius’ (μάλα δὲ τὸν Κωνστάντιον ᾑρηκὼς
ἀνήρ) in Lib. Or. 1.39. Cf. also n. 55.
46 In Ep. 440 Foerster, Libanius refers to himself as a ‘man who has often sung his (Constantius’)
praises’. In Ep. 48 Foerster, Libanius reacts to an invitation from the Master of the Offices Florentius
to come to court and speak for Constantius, saying that whilst his bodily condition prevents him from
coming, he might give a speech for the emperor if he comes to Antioch. Cf. Wiemer (n. 4), 27–8.
47 According to its hypothesis, Oration 1 was ‘delivered at Ancyra in Galatia when he first met the
king, while still a young man’. In his Letter to the Senate 22c–d, Constantius also indicates that he has
long been familiar with Themistius.
48 Pace W. Portmann, Geschichte in der spätantiken Panegyrik (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), 128
and W. Portmann, ‘Die 59. Rede des Libanios und das Datum der Schlacht von Singara’, ByzZ 82
(1989), 1–18, at 6, neither Constantius nor Constans can have been present when Libanius delivered
his panegyric. Cf. P.-L. Malosse, Libanios. Discours LIX, Collection des Universités de France (Paris,
2003), 8. And whilst Constantius spent much time in Antioch between 337 and 350, Libanius was
away from his home city between 336 and 354.
49 For the date of Oration 1, see above, n. 11.
50 Imperial decree before panegyric: Oration 1.37, referring to 340/1 (δόγματά τɛ ἐγράϕɛτο παρὰ
τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἐπαγγέλλοντα τὴν ἐμὴν αὐτοῦ μονήν); imperial summons to return to
Constantinople after panegyric: Oration 1.74, referring to 348/9 (βασιλɛίοις γράμμασιν). As will
be shown in § IV, Libanius’ first oration is no ‘objective’ account of the sophist’s career. With regard
to official documents, however, he could hardly tell blatant lies. Moreover, as R. Kaster, ‘The salaries
of Libanius’, Chiron 13 (1983), 37–59 has shown, Libanius continued to enjoy an imperial salary for
much of his career as a teacher, except for a brief period some time after his return to Antioch.
51 For the traditional date of Oration 59 in 348/9, cf. G.R. Sievers, Das Leben des Libanius (Berlin,
1868), 56 n. 13 and R. Foerster, Libanii Opera (Leipzig, 1903–23), 201. Since the new dating of the
Battle of Singara (cf. Portmann [n. 48]), it has been suggested that Oration 59 may date from 344/5,
yet as P.-L. Malosse, ‘Enquête sur la date du Discours 59 de Libanios’, AntTard 9 (2001), 297–306
and (n. 48), 9–10 has demonstrated, the terminus post quem for Oration 59 is 346, which makes a date
in 347/8 most likely.
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did.52 In addition, before adlecting Themistius to the senate, Constantius bestowed
numerous gifts on Libanius (Lib. Or. 1.80). Libanius, then, seems to have been well
on his way to becoming Constantius’ preferred sophist. If in the end the job went to
Themistius, this was not in the first place Constantius’ decision but Libanius’ own:
when Libanius left Constantinople for Antioch, this was against the explicit and
repeated wishes of the emperor.53 It is noteworthy in this respect that Themistius’ adlec-
tion to the senate in September 355 follows a year and a half of letters trying to bring
Libanius back to Constantinople, and precedes by only a few months a letter in which
Libanius writes that his friends have told him that the emperor has finally accepted his
move to Antioch (Ep. 480 Foerster, early 356).54
Thus far, four conclusions can be drawn regarding the situation of Greek culture
under the reign of Constantius. First, in order to build up the city of Constantinople,
Constantius apparently thought it important to invite cultural figures: fortifying a city
with walls, adorning her with buildings and crowding her with citizens may be impor-
tant advantages, yet the crown goes to intellect and learning.55 And indeed, Constantius
had established a sophist from Cappadocia in the chair of rhetoric in Constantinople
by the early 340s,56 he repeatedly tried to keep Libanius in Constantinople throughout
the decade and, after that failed, adlected Themistius to the city’s senate. Second,
Constantius was apparently happy to promote people who possessed a very traditional
kind of cultural capital, in which Hellenic tradition went hand in hand with pagan
beliefs: there is no sign, in the texts we have looked at, that Constantius would have
given preference to cultured Christians over pagans such as Bemarchius, Libanius or
Themistius.57 On the contrary: as was shown by Peter Heather, ‘Themistius’ participa-
tion in a Christian-led regime carried something of a talismanic quality. For a whole
series of Christian emperors, employing Themistius affirmed a commitment to continu-
ity – vital for attracting elite support – in the midst of cultural transformation. As a phi-
losopher, he was the guardian of traditional paideia. If he could speak in favour of a
particular Christian emperor, and if that emperor was happy to favour him, this sent
52 Lib. Or. 59: delivered between 344 and 349, acknowledgement for it in 349 at the latest; Them.
Or. 1: delivered in 347 or 350, acknowledgement for it in 355.
53 For Libanius’ return to Antioch and imperial efforts to bring him back to Constantinople, cf. J.
Wintjes, Das Leben des Libanius, Historische Studien der Universität Würzburg 2 (Rahden, 2005),
99–115. It is possible, in fact, that Constantius also implicitly criticizes Libanius when commending
Themistius because ‘he chooses the city of his own free will and is not forced to lie here because he
has to, but would leave only if forced to do so’ (Letter to the Senate 22b). For the criticism of
Constantinopolitan senators implied in this commendation, cf. Heather and Moncur (n. 7), 113 n. 205.
54 Whilst it is true that some forty-five letters precede Libanius’ letter of congratulation to
Themistius at the occasion of his adlection (Ep. 434 Foerster), Libanius may well have decided to
start publishing his letters in books after his return to Antioch had been secured. The importance
of Themistius’ adlection in his own return to Antioch may be mirrored in the central position of
the letter of congratulations in Book 5 (Ep. 390–493).
55 For Constantinople as a city of culture, see also Henck (n. 4), 177–9.
56 Lib. Or. 1.35, referring to 340/1, states that upon his arrival in Constantinople, a Cappadocian
held a chair ‘βασιλέως πέμποντος’. The verb πέμπω can refer either to the fact that the emperor
sent him <a letter> to invite him to the chair, or to the fact that the emperor sent this man from
Cappadocia <to Constantinople>, thus stressing Constantius’ efforts in building up the new capital.
57 It should be noted, however, that all three authors seem to have adapted their religious ideas in
their orations for Constantius. For Themistius’ accomodation of Christians as well as pagans in
Oration 1, cf. n. 12 above. Libanius’ Oration 59, on the other hand, was termed by Malosse
(n. 48), 63 a monotheistic discourse. And of Bemarchius, Libanius states that ‘although he personally
was a worshipper of the gods, he spoke in praise of him who had set himself up against them, and
discoursed at length upon the church Constantius had built for him’ (Or. 1.39).
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an important signal to Hellenic elites’.58 Third, it should be noted that Constantius not
only promotes Greek cultural figures but also takes an active part in Greek culture him-
self. Paideia is, in other words, not only held in honour by him, but also used for his
own ends: by entering into dialogue with classical and contemporary Greek texts, the
emperor adroitly furthers his own ends.59 Finally, the actors involved clearly understood
the game. Far from conveying the impression that Constantius’ reign offered no possi-
bilities for men of traditional culture and religion, the texts discussed show that an
intense competition was going on, not only between different individuals striving for
the most powerful places, but also between different kinds of cultural capital:
Themistius poses as a philosopher and Constantius presents him as a teacher of philos-
ophy, whilst Libanius presents himself as a sophist and a teacher of rhetoric.60
III. JULIAN, LETTER TO NILUS DIONYSIUS
Given the success enjoyed by the philosopher Themistius under Constantius, and given
Julian’s own well-known interest in philosophy,61 it is not hard to understand why
people might think philosophy to be a good way of approaching the new emperor. A
case in point was the Roman senator Nilus Dionysius. Some time in mid-361, after hav-
ing been proclaimed Augustus by his troops in Paris against the will of Constantius II,
Julian offered Nilus an office. Fearing the upcoming civil war between Julian and
Constantius, Nilus refused. Julian then wrote the senator a brief letter in which he
repeated the offer – a letter to which Nilus did not reply, thus again refusing to take
up office under Julian. Soon afterwards, however, Constantius II died (November 3rd
361) and Julian became sole Emperor. As a result, the tables were reversed. Nilus has-
tened to court, probably in Constantinople in winter 361 or spring 362, yet Julian
refused to receive Nilus in audience. Nilus therefore wrote Julian a letter, in which he
apologized for his past reactions and suggested that he would accept if Julian summoned
him again to take up public office. Julian replied to this with a letter of his own, and it is
this letter that has been preserved (Ep. 50 Wright).62
58 Heather and Moncur (n. 7), 23–4. Themistius’ moderate ‘paganism’ as an Aristotelian philoso-
pher – maybe in deliberate opposition to some Neoplatonic philosophers who vehemently opposed the
emperor’s Christianity (cf. G. Fowden, ‘The pagan holy man in late antique society’, JHS 102 [1982],
33–59) – will have argued in his favour.
59 One can of course argue that the letter was written by the ab epistulis (cf. F. Millar, The Emperor
in the Roman World (31 BC – AD 337) [London, 1977], 91–4) rather than by the emperor himself. Be
that as it may, what matters is that the letter was approved by the emperor and presented to the senate
as a letter from Constantius.
60 Julian also seems to have taken part in the battle for Constantius’ cultural attention: as shown by
S. Schorn, ‘Legitimation und Sicherung von Herrschaft durch Kritik am Kaiser. Zum sogenannten
zweiten Panegyrikos Julians auf Kaiser Constantius (Oratio 2 [3] Bidez)’, in T. Baier and M.
Amerise (edd.), Die Legitimation von Einzelherrschaft im Kontext der Generationenthematik
(Berlin, 2008), 243–74, Julian, in Oration 3, tried to present himself rather than Themistius as a
good candidate to be Constantius’ court philosopher. Themistius, conversely, seems to have tried
to dissuade Julian from presenting himself as a philosopher. Cf. Stenger (n. 5), 136–51.
61 See the differing assessments of Julian’s philosophical qualities in P. Athanassiadi, Julian and
Hellenism: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford, 1981) and R. Smith, Julian’s Gods: Religion and
Philosophy in the Thought and Action of Julian the Apostate (London, 1995).
62 For a long time, scholars dated Julian’s Letter to Nilus Dionysius to New Year 362–3. Cf.
R. Asmus, ‘Julians Brief an Dionysios’, AGPh 15 (1902), 425–41, at 432 n. 11; W.C. Wright,
The Works of the Emperor Julian, vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA and London, 1923), 157; and
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To state that Julian’s letter shows that the emperor was upset with Nilus would be an
understatement. The fact that Nilus did not immediately choose Julian’s side and accept
his offer of an official position will not, of course, have disposed the emperor positively
towards the Roman senator. Yet in itself this unhappy political choice can hardly
account for Julian’s furious letter: many others found themselves in the same situation
and did not receive any invective.63 As Ammianus tells us, the Roman senate as a whole
rejected Julian’s advances to them and openly supported Constantius.64 It should also be
pointed out that Julian, upon Nilus’ initial refusal of his offer, first wrote what was
clearly a friendly letter, whereas the letter we have was written only after Julian had
received Nilus’ letter.65 Julian’s letter, then, is in the first place an answer to Nilus’
letter, rather than to his decision not to accept office.
As a result, Julian’s arguments offer good insight into Nilus’ letter as well. The pic-
ture that emerges is that Nilus, offended by Julian’s refusal to receive him in audience,
donned the robes of a philosopher in order to press Julian to summon him again to take
up office. Julian’s last quotation from Nilus’ letter offers a good illustration:
οὐ γὰρ τοὺς ἐξ ἑτοίμου ϕὴς ἥκοντας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐϕɛδρɛύοντας ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βɛβαίᾳ
κρίσɛι χρωμένους καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ δέον αἱρουμένους, τούτους δɛῖν ἀλλὰ <οὐ> τοὺς
ἑτοίμως ὑπακούοντας αἱρɛῖσθαι. καλάς γɛ ἡμῖν ἐλπίδας ὑποϕαίνɛις οὐδὲν δɛομένοις ὡς
ὑπɛίξων, ἢν αὖθίς <σɛ> καλῶμɛν ἐπὶ κοινωνίαν πραγμάτων.
(Julian, Letter to Nilus Dionysius 446B)
You tell me indeed that it is not those who arrive offhand or those who are hunting for public
office whom we ought to choose, but those who use sound judgement and in accordance with
this prefer to do their duty rather than those who are ready and eager to obey. Fair, truly, are the
hopes you hold out to me though I made no appeal to you, implying that you will yield if I again
summon you to take part in public business.
(tr. Wright [1923], 175)
Although Julian had not asked him for anything, Nilus had pointed out how one should
(δɛῖν) choose one’s collaborators. The senator had thus taken an authoritative stance vis-
à-vis the emperor. With a few misplaced words or unhappy comparisons here and there,
it is not difficult to imagine why Julian may have been disgruntled. In order to justify
his stance and avoid such an interpretation, Nilus had appealed to the tradition of the
M. Caltabiano, ‘Il senatore romano Nilo e la paideia ellenica’, in Collectanea Philologica II in hon-
orem Annae Mariae Komornicka (Lodz, 1995), 41–51. More recently, however, H.-U. Wiemer, ‘Das
Missgeschick des Nilus. Zeit und Umstände von Julians offenem Brief gegen den römischen Senator
Nilus Dionysius’, Klio 78 (1996), 192–7 has convincingly shown September/October 362 to be the
terminus ante quem.
63 It is well known that Aurelius Victor, for example, was made consular governor of Pannonia
Secunda by, and received a statue from, Julian in 361 notwithstanding his previous position under,
and support for, Constantius. Cf. C.E.V. Nixon, ‘Aurelius Victor and Julian’, CPh 86 (1991), 113–
25. On Victor’s adoption by Julian, cf. Amm. Marc. 21.10.6; on his position under Constantius, cf.
H.W. Bird, Aurelius Victor. De Caesaribus (Liverpool, 1994), viii and Henck (n. 4), 173.
64 Amm. Marc. 21.10.7. A number of individual senators, on the other hand, chose the opposite
course and accepted political office when Julian offered it to them: Ammianus (21.12.24–5) refers
to Rufinus Vulcatius’ nephew Maximus (made prefect of the city), Mamertinus (praetorian prefect
of Illyricum made consul) and Nevitta (made consul).
65 Julian himself explicitly points out that although Nilus, as a senator, disobeyed a command from
his emperor, he chose not to punish him, although he would have had legal grounds for doing so.
Instead, he wrote him a letter, hoping to convince him (446A). The punishment, i.e. the current letter,
came only after Nilus’ own letter.
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free-speaking philosopher66 giving advice to the king. Dio Chrysostom, as we have
already seen, presented the acceptance of παρρησία as the mark of a good king, as
opposed to the tyrant who would exile free-speaking philosophers. As is clear from
Julian’s letter, Nilus seems to have referred to his frankness in the face of Constans,
from whose court he claimed to have been chased ‘because he gave offence in the
cause of truth’ (ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθɛίας ϕὴς προσκρούσας ἀπηλλάχθαι, 445B). On the one
hand, mentioning his past frankness served to underscore his long-standing philosophical
credentials. On the other hand, mentioning Constans’ bad reaction to his frankness may
have been intended by Nilus as an apotropaic, negative example for Julian. Julian, how-
ever, is not impressed by Nilus’ reference to this episode: since many base men were dri-
ven away by Constans, the emperor argues, Nilus’ removal does not prove his dedication
to truth. In addition, Julian points out that ‘it does not happen to a virtuous and temperate
man to go away obnoxious to those in power’ (445B): Nilus was no true philosopher, as
true philosophers are either cherished by good kings, or executed by bad ones.
Julian’s reply, then, calls Nilus’ bluff when presenting himself as a philosopher.
Indeed, the emperor explicitly states that Nilus exhibits ‘what Plato calls a twofold
lack of knowledge’: not only does he not have any knowledge, he also does not realize
his own lack of knowledge. Plato and, by extension, philosophy, are thus turned against
the would-be philosopher. Again, if Nilus boasted of his fearlessness (ἀϕοβία, 444A)
and great courage (μέγα θάρσος, 444A), Julian terms it lack of knowledge (ἀμαθία,
444B) and ignorance (ἄγνοια, 444B), and, at another point, ‘excessive audacity, bold-
ness, licence of tongue, ferocity of soul, madness of wits and perverse fury in every
respect’ (446A). Or again, Julian compares Nilus’ so-called ‘freedom of speech’ to
Thersites’ (445B), and calls it not παρρησία, but ἐμβροντησία, suggesting uncontrolled
noise with possibly devastating consequences. In all these passages, then, Julian demon-
strates that Nilus is not the philosopher he pretends to be. This process of unmasking, of
tearing down Nilus’ philosophical self-presentation, is, in fact, the key to Julian’s letter,
as he himself indicates:
†… μή τι καὶ νομισθɛίης ἀνήρ, οὐκ ἀνὴρ ὤν, καὶ παρρησίας μɛστός, ἐμβροντησίας
ὢν πλήρης, καὶ παιδɛίας μɛτɛσχηκώς, οὐδὲ γρὺ λόγων ἁψάμɛνος, ὅσα γɛ ɛἰκός ἐστι
ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς σου τɛκμήρασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ‘ϕροῦδον’ οὐδɛὶς ɛἶπɛ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐπὶ τοῦ
προϕανοῦς, ὥσπɛρ σὺ νῦν, ἐπɛὶ τὰς ἄλλας σου τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἁμαρτίας οὐδɛὶς ἂν
ἐπɛξɛλθɛῖν ἐν μακρῷ πάνυ βιβλίῳ δυνηθɛίη.
(Julian, Letter to Nilus Dionysius 446A–B)
†…lest you should be thought to be a man, when you are not, or brimful of freedom of speech,
when you merely flow over with uncontrolled noise, or that you have had the advantage of edu-
cation when you have not the smallest acquaintance with literature, as far, at any rate, as one
may reasonably judge from your letters. For instance, no one of the ancients ever used
ϕροῦδος to mean ‘manifest’ as you do here, – for, as for the other blunders displayed in
your letter, no one could describe them even in a long book.
(tr. Wright [1923], 175 modified)
In addition to freedom of speech, Julian – in a combination familiar from the second
century67 – here denies Nilus manliness and education. Nilus’ effeminacy pops up at
various other points in the text. At the beginning, for instance, Julian addresses Nilus
66 Cf. also the references to sound judgement (κρίσɛι) and duty (τὸ δέον) in this passage.
67 See e.g. M. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton,
1995), 82–158; Whitmarsh (n. 1), 109–16.
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with a line from the comic poet Philemon, in which a woman (γύναι, 443D) is
reproached for praising herself. At another point (446A), he adduces a Homeric verse
that is addressed, in Iliad 5.428, by Zeus to Aphrodite, stating that Nilus is made not
for the works of war, but for those of love. Although pretending to be a man, Nilus
thus turns out to be effeminate. In addition, as Pierre-Louis Malosse has demonstrated,
Nilus is implicitly and explicitly said to have prostituted himself.68 As such, these com-
ments about Nilus’ gender become a proxy for his behaviour towards Julian: although
pretending to be a philosopher he is, in fact, merely selling himself to Julian in return for
an office. If he offended Julian, it was by expecting the same reaction from Julian as he
got from previous emperors to whom he offered himself uninvited (443D) – as was the
case with Constans who, at least initially, received Nilus in his camp. Julian’s other
denial in the passage quoted regards Nilus’ education. In what surely is one of the
most vivid scenes illustrating the value attached by the Second Sophistic to Atticism,
Julian points out Nilus’ lack of mastery of the (classical Attic) Greek language: he
reproaches him with having used the word ϕροῦδος in a sense not attested in the clas-
sical canon.69 Elsewhere in his letter, Julian also reproaches the senator for his lack of
literary education. When bringing up literary references to widely read authors such as
Plato, Babrius or even Homer, for example, Julian suggests that although Nilus may
have heard of their texts, he may well not actually have read them or know them
well enough. Lucian’s satires of would-be intellectuals are not far removed from this.70
No matter, then, how great Julian’s interests in Greek culture and philosophy were,
his Letter to Nilus Dionysius serves as a clear warning to all (οὐ σοὶ μόνον … πᾶσιν,
446B), as he himself explicitly states at the end of his letter, that not just any claim to
philosophy or education will do in order to be embraced by the emperor.71 Promotion
because of one’s cultural capital not only required a great mastery over the classical
Greek language and literature and a persuasive self-presentation, it also required
Fingerspitzengefühl, a feel for the game: no less than in the second century, one had
to seize the opportunity (καιρός) to say the right thing to the right person in the right
place and in the right way.
IV. LIBANIUS
A good illustration of the prestige and influence Greek culture could still wield in the
fourth century is offered by Libanius. As stated in the introduction, Libanius is usually
68 P.-L. Malosse, ‘Rhétorique, philosophie et prostitution’, in D. Auger and E. Wolff (edd.),
Culture classique et christianisme. Mélanges offerts à Jean Bouffartigue (Paris, 2008), 57–70, 65–7.
69 On the missed opportunity, in Nilus’ letter, to highlight the writer’s paideia through a correct use
of the Attic language, see K. Luchner, ‘Grund, Fundament, Mauerwerk, Dach? Julian’s ϕιλοσοϕία im
Netzwerk seiner Briefe’, in C. Schäfer (ed.), Kaiser Julian ‘Apostata’ und die philosophische Reaktion
gegen das Christentum (Berlin and New York, 2008), 221–52, at 242–3. For the importance of
Atticism in the Second Sophistic, see W. Schmid, Der Atticismus in seinem Hauptvertretern von
Dionysius von Halikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus (Stuttgart, 1887–97); Swain (n. 1), 43–
64; Schmitz (n. 1), 67–96; Whitmarsh (n. 1), 6–7 and T. Whitmarsh, The Second Sophistic, New
Surveys in the Classics 35 (Oxford, 2005), 41–7.
70 Cf. Lucianic texts such as Against the Ignorant Book Collector, Nigrinus or Philosophies for
Sale. Likewise, Dio Chrysostom, in his fourth Kingship Oration, states that having read many
books in itself does not make one a pepaideumenos, let alone a good man (§ 30). For a discussion
of such would-be pepaideumenoi, see Schmitz (n. 1), 146–56.
71 Cf. also Malosse (n. 68).
LIEVE VAN HOOF402
adduced as an example of a person who was promoted by Julian because of his Hellenic
culture in a world where this was fast losing importance. As we shall see, it is not dif-
ficult to find passages in Libanius’ works that seem, at least at first sight, to confirm this
impression. In reality, however, things were much less straightforward. In order to
demonstrate this, I briefly discuss the context of Oration 14 in general, and then look
in some more detail at a few paragraphs of Libanius’ Autobiography.
Libanius and Julian in all probability first met whilst Libanius was teaching and
Julian studying in Nicomedia in the 340s.72 Notwithstanding a letter that suggests ‘cor-
dial relations’73 between the two men in the 350s, however, Libanius seems to have
been nothing more than one amongst many cultural figures known to Julian. During
and after the civil war, he was not amongst those who either hastened to, or were sum-
moned by, the new Augustus.74 Even when Julian came to Antioch in July 362,
Libanius did not immediately enjoy an influential position. In fact, his first speech to
the emperor, Oration 13, whatever its pretensions, was delivered not upon the official
arrival of the emperor in the city, but after it. In addition, Hans-Ulrich Wiemer has
shown that this speech, in which Libanius suggested that Julian adopt him as his
court orator, was not successful.75 The next speech Libanius delivered for Julian,
Oration 14, on the other hand, was very successful: in September/October 362,
Libanius asked and got a lucrative job for his friend Aristophanes of Corinth, who
had been accused of treason as well as of corruption under Constantius. Julian’s reaction
to Oration 14 came to Libanius in the form of a highly enthusiastic letter, in which the
emperor announces Aristophanes’ acquittal, praises Libanius’ speech and invites the
orator to come and discuss what job would be best given to Aristophanes (Julian. Ep.
53). What, then, accounts for Libanius’ sudden success?
One explanation is that Julian was extremely pleased by Oration 14 itself, which is
indeed not only carefully constructed in accordance with the rules of the art, but which
also brims with allusions to the emperor’s programme of cultural revival and presents
Aristophanes as a defender of that cultural programme.76 As the text makes clear, how-
ever, Libanius was sure of his success even before he first sent the speech to Julian.77
How, then, if not (only) through Oration 14, did the change in Julian’s attitude
towards Libanius come about between July and September/October 362? Two elements
seem to have played a role. First, Libanius himself had definitely prepared well for
Aristophanes’ case: before sending his oration to the emperor, he lobbied for him by
72 The best surveys of Libanius’ relations with, and orations for, Julian are R. Scholl, Historische
Beiträge zu den Julianischen Reden des Libanios (Stuttgart, 1994) and Wiemer (n. 4), on whom I rely
heavily in this paragraph.
73 S. Bradbury, Selected Letters of Libanius from the Age of Constantius and Julian, Translated
Texts for Historians 41 (Liverpool, 2004), 52. For the identity of the addressee, see Wiemer (n. 62).
74 For Libanius and Julian before Julian’s arrival in Antioch: Wiemer (n. 4), 13–47, discussing the
initial lack of contact after Julian came to power on pp. 35–47 and the situation of other cultural
figures at the same time on pp. 32–5.
75 Date of delivery: Ep. 736 Foerster; no success: Wiemer (n. 4), 43 and 77–123.
76 For the structure of the speech according to the guidelines of the συμβουλɛυτικὸς λόγος, as well
as for a survey of its contents, see Wiemer (n. 4), 125–7 and 135–41. Focussing on Libanius’ com-
ments on Aristophanes’ paganism, Wiemer comes to the conclusion (p. 146) that religious affiliation
was Julian’s top priority when taking decisions. Although valuable in itself, this analysis seems to put
rather too much weight on religion to the neglect of Greek culture more generally as well as extra-
textual elements influencing Julian’s reaction.
77 Pace Stenger (n. 5), 291–2. The speech was not delivered, but sent to Julian in written form. Cf.
Lib. Ep. 760 Foerster and Julian. Ep. 96 and 97.
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writing letters to a range of courtiers, to whose support for Aristophanes he refers in his
speech. He used, in other words, his network at court. Nevertheless, one could never be
sure about a letter’s reception, as is clear from a letter in which Libanius tells Julian how
Aristophanes feared that he would undergo Nilus’ fate.78 The second element that con-
tributed to Libanius’ growing influence at court has to do less with the orator than with
the emperor. During his stay in Antioch Julian, from August 362 onwards, fell out with
Antioch and its city council. As a result, he could well use a local spokesman.79
Eloquent, sharing several of his ideas and hailing from a curial family, Libanius
obviously made for an excellent candidate. Whilst Julian may therefore have started
to invite Libanius to court from some time in August onwards, his endorsement of
Libanius was openly sealed with his enthusiastic letter following Oration 14. As
Themistius had probably done with Constantius’ Demegoria, Libanius decided to
append this letter of Julian to his speech.80
If, then, Julian’s political needs and Libanius’ curial background played a major role
in his adoption by the emperor, Libanius himself in his Autobiography ascribes his rise
and position under Julian exclusively to his oratorical talents. Indeed, in the paragraphs
of his Autobiography that deal with Julian’s stay in Antioch, Libanius presents the
emperor as highly desirous of his oratory from the very outset: according to Libanius,
Julian says that hearing Libanius is the main advantage of travelling to Antioch, he
asks him during the adventus ceremony when he will hear him declaim and he soon
issues a series of letters and invitations. The latter offer a striking contrast with Nilus.
According to Libanius’ Autobiography, Julian sent him a letter when he did not turn
up when the emperor sacrificed in public, as opposed to a throng of other people, desig-
nated by Libanius as flatterers. The tone of Julian’s letter, Libanius says, was one of
gentle reproof (μɛτὰ χαρίτων καθήπτɛτο, Oration 1.122). As such, then, it may have
been comparable to the initial, brief letter sent by Julian to Nilus after the latter first
refused his offer of an office. The sequence, however, is very different. Like Nilus even-
tually, Libanius sent a letter to Julian in reply: Libanius reproved Julian as much as
Julian had reproved him. Yet, as opposed to Nilus, he did so with equal charm (καὶ
αὐτὸς σὺν χάρισιν, Oration 1.122) and thereby managed to make Julian blush rather
than make him angry. Later, the emperor therefore asks him over for lunch. Libanius
answers that he does not go out for lunch, only for dinner. The emperor therefore
asks him for dinner, yet Libanius has the guts to say that he will not come because
of a headache. When the emperor therefore tells him to visit him often, Libanius pictures
himself as replying that he will do so if invited. Whilst the emperor considered Nilus’
suggestion that he issue another invitation an abuse, Libanius comments that the
emperor consented and did as he asked. Libanius thus appears as the genius who man-
ages to outwit the emperor.
78 Lib. Ep. 758 Foerster = 95 Norman. As Libanius recounts it in his letter, the anecdote is clearly
intended to be amusing. It should be taken into account, however, that the letter was written in reaction
to, and thus after, the enthusiastic letter in which Julian expressed approval of Libanius’ oration
(Julian. Ep. 53 Wright). While at this point in time Libanius could join in the courtiers’ laughter, it
is much less certain that he would not have been concerned before receiving the emperor’s approval,
given the serious fate that had recently befallen Nilus, as well as his own earlier lack of success in
convincing Julian.
79 For Libanius as a helpful voice in the 362/3 Antiochene crisis, see L. Van Hoof and P. Van
Nuffelen, ‘Monarchy and mass communication. Antioch A.D. 362/3 revisited’, JRS 101 (2011),
166–84, at 178–84.
80 Lib. Ep. 758 Foerster = 95.4 Norman.
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It should not be forgotten, however, that the Autobiography was written by Libanius
more than ten years after the events, in the knowledge of his spectacular rise under
Julian. If we compare it to the historical facts about the relationship between
Libanius and Julian as described above, the sophist’s presentation of his relationship
with the emperor is much more positive than what actually happened.81 Libanius him-
self betrays this discrepancy when stating that the only reason why it seemed to people –
although, he hastens to add, not to himself – that he was quite out of favour with the
emperor, was a jealous courtier who prevented Libanius and Julian from becoming inti-
mate (Oration 1.123). In addition, Libanius’ Autobiography suggests a rather one-way
desire: it is Julian who courts Libanius, whilst Libanius’ own efforts to gain Julian’s
attention, for example through the delivery of Oration 13, are passed over in silence.
If, then, the Autobiography seems, at first sight, to confirm the traditional image of
Julian as a highly cultured emperor who adopts people such as Libanius as his
advisors because of their cultural achievements, this is not so much an objective descrip-
tion of reality, as a carefully constructed image. Composed with hindsight, the
Autobiography conceals fears and failures in order to promote its author as a disinter-
ested oratorical genius. Context, in other words, greatly matters.
CONCLUSION
The texts discussed in this paper all show the vitality of traditional Greek culture in the
fourth century, and that in two senses. First, Greek culture, far from being moribund or
severely menaced by new trends such as Christianity, legal studies or shorthand, was
fully alive: even a Christian emperor such as Constantius, often depicted as a strong pro-
moter of advocates and shorthand writers, attached great importance to traditional Greek
culture when designing the capital and empire of the future. Moreover, far from being
confined to the classroom, as several recent studies seem to suggest,82 Greek culture also
appears from these texts as very much present in society: shared by ‘pagans’ and
Christians, professionals and amateurs alike, oratory, philosophy and literature could
be and were in fact used in order to attract attention, be assigned political office, pro-
mote one’s friends or, conversely, to block someone’s ascent in society. In order to
be successful, however, orators, philosophers and writers needed to realize the vitality
of Greek culture in the second sense: Greek culture was not a fossilized set of ready-
made topoi, but needed to be performed successfully. In addition to knowing one’s clas-
sics, one also had to be able to play with them and adapt them flexibly to ever-changing
circumstances: mere reference to, or unsuccessful manipulation of, the classics could be
as detrimental for one’s reputation and position as it had been in the second century.
Greek culture, then, could be an instrument for social promotion, yet in order to cash
in one’s cultural capital for political capital, one had to master it perfectly, handle it care-
fully and try and create optimal circumstances.
It will be clear that the image of late antique Greek culture sketched here differs sub-
stantially from the traditional interpretations presented in the introduction, which focus
81 For a detailed analysis of Libanius’ Autobiography as a narrative text constructing Libanius’ past
and identity, see L. Van Hoof, ‘Libanius’ Life and life. A narratological analysis of Libanius’
Autobiography’, forthcoming in L. Van Hoof (ed.), Libanius: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge,
2013).
82 e.g. Cribiore (n. 3); Malosse and Schouler (n. 3), 179.
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on the question of whether or not certain emperors are favourably disposed towards
Greek culture, and whether or not certain authors present these emperors’ cultural
achievements truthfully. Irrespective of the answers given to these questions, those tra-
ditional views are rooted in the paradigm of continuity versus change, often with a clear
preference for the latter due to the adoption of an equally dichotomous religious per-
spective (‘pagans’ versus Christians). Recent research on late antiquity, however, is dis-
tancing itself both from the dominant focus on religion and from the discourse of
change, as these dichotomies have been shown to be too simplistic to account for the
variety of voices and trends in the fourth century, which can be explained much better
in terms of transformation and adaptation. Clear either/or divisions have thus made way
for more complex and dynamic explorations of how traditional elements were adapted to
ever-changing circumstances.83
Drawing inspiration from these new approaches to late antiquity, this article has
demonstrated that the social position of Greek culture under the reigns of Constantius
and Julian was rather more complex than has often been suggested. Constantius, as
we have seen, not only allocated an important role to men of culture when building
up his new capital, but also managed to play along with the game and manipulate
Greek culture to suit his own ends. In the case of Julian, we have seen that whilst a
text such as Libanius’ Autobiography seems to confirm the image of an emperor willing
to endorse men of culture at almost any cost, allowing them to determine the terms of
their interaction with him, this is not an innocent description of historical reality but a
rhetorical strategy designed to present its author in the best possible light. Other texts
make clear, moreover, that Julian was not willing to promote just anybody with literary
or philosophical pretensions: Nilus was straightforwardly rejected and even Libanius’
fate seems to have depended on much more than just rhetorical ability. Thus both
Constantius and Julian engaged with Greek culture but neither of them was willing to
promote it unconditionally: traditional structures and topoi could still be used, but a suc-
cessful performance required not only a credible self-presentation and desirable assets,
but also adaptation to new values and to changing political circumstances.
As will be clear from this, adaptation and transformation imply both continuity and
change. If the case studies presented in this article convey the impression of stressing
continuity, this is not to be seen as a negation of change: in no way would I like to
suggest that the implementation or position of Greek culture did not change at all in
the fourth century, or that the traditional image of its situation in late antiquity is entirely
wrong. But in reaction to the traditional view that has tended to highlight change, the
case studies selected for this article show that this is not the only perspective possible.
The real point, then, is that the debate cannot be framed in simple terms of either con-
tinuity or change: as this article has shown, a contextualized rhetorical analysis of indi-
vidual texts is needed in order to understand the complex uses to which Greek culture
was put in fourth-century society. Only through such analyses will we be able to come
to a full understanding of the dynamics of late antique Greek culture as well as the role
and place of paideia in late antique society.
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83 e.g. A.P. Johnson, ‘Hellenism and its discontents in Late Antiquity’, in S.F. Johnson (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity (Oxford, 2012), 433–66 on Hellenism as a toolbox.
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